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Exit is a ubiquitous feature of life, whether breaking up in a marriage, 
dropping a college course, or pulling out of a venture capital investment. In fact, 
our exit options often determine whether and how we enter in the first place. 
While legal scholarship is replete with studies of exit strategies for businesses 
and individuals, administrative law scholarship has barely touched the topic 
of exit. Yet exit plays just as central a role in the regulatory state as elsewhere–
–welfare support ends, government steps out of rate-setting. In this Article, we 
argue that exit is a fundamental feature of regulatory design and should be 
explicitly considered at the time of program creation.  
Part II starts from first principles and sets out the basic features of 
regulatory exit. It addresses the design challenges of exit strategies and how to 
measure success of exit.  With these descriptive and normative foundations in 
place, Part III develops a framework that explains the four basic types of 
regulatory exit strategies, exploring the political economy that determines each 
strategy and explaining when policy makers are most likely to adopt them. To 
demonstrate its usefulness in practice, the framework is applied as a case study 
in Part IV to the emerging challenge of fracking. We conclude by describing a 
new exit strategy model for regulatory design, a hybrid approach of “Lookback 
Exit.” 
Exit is a vast, central, yet largely unexplored aspect of administrative 
governance. By providing a fuller account, we demonstrate why exit warrants 
focused research and theoretical development in its own right, create a 
framework for the analysis of exit issues, and identify the key questions for 
future research. Doing so provides important insights, not only for 
understanding the practice we see around us today, but also for the design of 
programs to manage emerging issues. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is a way to get out of almost every relationship in modern 
society—married couples can divorce, partnerships can dissolve, 
students can drop courses, banks can foreclose on loans, and 
universities can quit athletic conferences. While people might not like 
to admit it, the fact that there are structured processes available to exit 
relationships strongly influences the way we enter relationships. The 
prenuptial agreement is a classic example, serving as a pre-planned 
roadmap in the event of future marital dissolution, as is the agreement 
venture capital firms sign before investing in start-ups.1 The reality is 
that a wide variety of relationships only get started because one or more 
 
 1.  See Allison A. Marston, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial Agreements, 49 
STAN. L. REV. 887, 890–92 (1997). Exit strategies are so important for venture capital firms that 
the topic is taught in business schools. Xu Han, Visiting Lecturer, The Univ. of Penn., The Wharton 
Sch. Mgmt. Dept., Venture Capital and Entrepreneurial Management, (Fall 2013) (class on 
“Managing the Exit: IPO and alternative exit strategies”); Lena G. Goldberg, Senior Lecturer, 
Harvard Bus. Sch. MBA Program, Syllabus for Legal Aspects of Entrepreneurship, (course content 
includes surveying legal aspects of exit strategies, including PE exits). 
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of the parties devised an “exit strategy” before entering the 
relationship.2 
Exit is also a ubiquitous, inevitable feature of governance, and 
its challenges arise in a wider range of government activities than is 
commonly recognized. For welfare payments, when should particular 
recipients be deemed no longer eligible for public assistance? For voting 
rights, when should a district under federal supervision be excused 
from oversight? For energy production, when should government 
withdraw from electricity rate-setting? The list goes on and on—from 
deciding when to end pollution restrictions to shutting down a crop 
subsidy program. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that exit is 
ubiquitous in the background of the administrative state. The question 
is whether it should feature more prominently in the foreground. 
In some cases, of course, government exit strategies are closely 
scrutinized. For example, seeking to prevent the demise of one of 
America’s largest and most iconic corporations, in 2008 and 2009 the 
federal government provided nearly $50 billion to General Motors, 
taking a majority share in Detroit’s largest automobile company.3 The 
government also provided similarly extensive support to the insurance 
giant AIG and the “too big to fail” banks.4 At the time of the bailouts, 
newspapers and talk shows were abuzz with earnest debate over the 
government’s exit strategy.5 How would the government be able to get 
out of its financial entanglement? As one blogger commented at the 
time, “Our current government will have that problem when they 
finally have to decide what to do with the multitude of bailouts that are 
 
 2.  Searching for the term “exit strategy” in Westlaw’s Law Reviews and Journals database 
yields over 1,500 documents, the vast majority of which deal with exit strategies in business and 
financial settings. 
 3.  Tim Higgins, Ian Katz & Kasia Klimasinka, GM Bailout Ends as U.S. Sells Last of 
‘Government Motors’, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 9, 2013, 11:01 PM),  http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
2013-12-09/gm-bailout-ends-as-u-s-sells-last-of-government-motors-.html [http://perma.cc/L5KN-
2XTE].  
 4.  Bob Ivry, Bradley Keoun & Phil Kuntz, Secret Fed Loans Gave Banks $13 Billion 
Undisclosed to Congress, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 27, 2011, 6:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
2011-11-28/secret-fed-loans-undisclosed-to-congress-gave-banks-13-billion-in-income.html 
[http://perma.cc/7WM4-RDTH]; Matthew Karnitschnig, Deborah Solomon, Liam Pleven & Jon E. 
Hilsenrath, U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject Cash as Credit 
Dries Up, WALL STREET J., (Sept. 16, 2008, 11:59 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB122156561931242905 [http:// perma.cc/AB75-HH2B] (“The Fed will lend up to $85 billion to 
AIG, and the U.S. government will effectively get a 79.9% equity stake”). 
 5.  See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JUNE OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE AIG RESCUE, ITS IMPACT 
ON MARKETS, AND THE GOVERNMENT’S EXIT STRATEGY 196–222 (June 10, 2010) (discussing options 
the government did and could still consider for terminating support for AIG and requiring AIG’s 
repayment of federal funds).  
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ongoing. . . . [W]e will eventually need an ‘exit strategy’; and we may 
find that Iraq was easier to leave.”6 
The public discussions over an exit strategy prior to bailing out 
General Motors or invading Iraq seemed natural and necessary at the 
time.7 Nobody hoped for permanence in either case, so it was reasonable 
to ask the government to plan for exit at the outset. Surprisingly, 
though, similar concerns are largely absent in the administrative 
context. 
Before launching a new regulatory or entitlements program, 
which in effect establishes a new relationship between government and 
the regulated or benefited entities, does anyone ask about the 
government’s exit strategy? More to the point, should the government 
devise explicit, deliberate exit strategies for regulatory and 
entitlements programs? If so, what makes for an effective exit strategy? 
These may seem to be obvious questions, but they are rarely asked.8 
Traditional regulatory design asks how government should enter 
a regulatory space and design regulations to accomplish Goal X in a way 
that is efficient, effective, and equitable.9 We argue that this is only half 
 
 6.  Bailout Exit Strategy?, NEOAVATARA (Apr. 16, 2009), http://neoavatara.com/blog/ 
?p=3001 [http://perma.cc/JNU6-C37H]. Speaking of Iraq, many commentators questioned at the 
time of the invasion whether the United States had a coherent exit strategy. 
 7.  See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Iraq and the Future of United States Foreign Policy: 
Failures of Legitimacy, 31 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 149 (2004) (discussing the Iraq war exit 
strategy).   
 8.  In a fascinating exception at the founding of the country, Thomas Jefferson 
recommended that the Constitution should be rewritten every generation. Through this forced 
exit, governance would regularly be re-examined and renewed. As he wrote to James Madison, 
Every constitution, then, and every law, naturally expires at the end of nineteen years. 
If it be enforced longer, it is an act of force, and not of right. It may be said, that the 
succeeding generation exercising, in fact, the power of repeal, this leaves them as free 
as if the constitution or law had been expressly limited to nineteen years only. In the 
first place, this objection admits the right, in proposing an equivalent. But the power of 
repeal is not an equivalent. It might be, indeed, if every form of government were so 
perfectly contrived, that the will of the majority could always be obtained, fairly and 
without impediment. But this is true of no form. The people cannot assemble 
themselves; their representation is unequal and vicious. Various checks are opposed to 
every legislative proposition. Factions get possession of the public councils, bribery 
corrupts them, personal interests lead them astray from the general interests of their 
constituents; and other impediments arise, so as to prove to every practical man, that 
a law of limited duration is much more manageable than one which needs a repeal. 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (1789). ME 7:459, Papers 15:396. 
 9.  President Obama recently summarized the conventional regulatory design process, 
explaining that  
each agency must, among other things: (1) propose or adopt a regulation only upon a 
reasoned determination that its benefits justify its costs (recognizing that some benefits 
and costs are difficult to quantify); (2) tailor its regulations to impose the least burden 
on society, consistent with obtaining regulatory objectives, taking into account, among 
other things, and to the extent practicable, the costs of cumulative regulations; (3) 
select, in choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, those approaches that 
maximize net benefits (including potential economic, environmental, public health and 
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the task. Government should also ask how it will exit when it realizes 
it (1) has accomplished Goal X, (2) is not achieving Goal X, or (3) has 
regulated more than necessary to achieve Goal X. 
Asking about exit is thus a key first step, but only the first, for 
the design of exit strategies presents other difficult challenges. 
Premature exit may negate the benefits gained from intervention in the 
first place or even make matters worse. The bird delisted too soon from 
the Endangered Species Act may still need protection and be pushed 
closer to extinction as a result. On the other hand, making exit too 
difficult might lead to locking-in of benefits for some interests, including 
the relevant agency and vested parties. This creates an effectively 
permanent relationship of dependence, often in the form of subsidy or 
shielding from competition. Just try terminating grazing allotments on 
federal public lands in the West.10 Consequently, exit strategies need to 
address both of these concerns directly. 
Even more important, as the field of law and economics has 
amply demonstrated, legal design influences behavior. Exit strategies 
are fundamental to what happens on the ground. It is often the case, 
though, that exit either is not contemplated beforehand or proves far 
more difficult than planned.11 In short, exit poses both a pervasive and 
complex challenge for the administrative state. 
This Article is the first to consider comprehensively the theory 
and practice of government exit. To be sure, many legal scholars have 
examined instances of exit in particular regulatory or entitlements 
programs.12 However, none has identified or explored the more general 
 
safety, and other advantages; distributive impacts; and equity); (4) to the extent 
feasible, specify performance objectives, rather than specifying the behavior or manner 
of compliance that regulated entities must adopt; and (5) identify and assess available 
alternatives to direct regulation, including providing economic incentives to encourage 
the desired behavior, such as user fees or marketable permits, or providing information 
upon which choices can be made by the public. 
Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011). 
 10.  See Bruce Huber, The Durability of Private Claims to Public Property, 102 GEO. L.J. 991, 
1005 (2014) (describing how grazing allotments, which are supposed to have defined terms, have 
become so entrenched as to be essentially perpetual). 
 11.  To be sure, deregulation can be a kind of exit strategy for the administrative state, but 
it is a blunt and awkward instrument. See CASS SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER 177–89 (2013) (discussing the 
Obama Administration’s deregulation initiative). As we show, deregulation is only one type of exit 
and more usually is simply the result of having no exit strategy. The cycle of regulation, 
deregulation, and reregulation is usually the product of political dynamics, not of a purposive exit 
strategy. Recently, for example, Congress intervened to legislate the removal of endangered 
species protections for gray wolves in several states after protracted administrative and judicial 
proceedings had stalled the delisting process. See generally Edward A. Fitzgerald, Alliance for Wild 
Rockies v. Salazar: Congress Behaving Badly, 25 VILLA. ENVTL. L.J. 351 (2014) (providing the full 
history of the congressionally-mandated delisting). 
 12.  See generally David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. 
L. REV. 265 (2013) (examining numerous regulatory programs that allow the agency to waive a 
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phenomenon of exit strategies in administrative practice and policy.13 
Focusing on exit reveals foundational questions not usually asked in 
administrative law scholarship: What is the range of exit strategies? 
Which are most appropriate for promoting certain behaviors of public 
and private actors? Which are most appropriate for preventing perverse 
behaviors? Nor are these just of theoretical interest. A deeper 
understanding of exit helps explain the shape administrative programs 
can and should take. As we demonstrate at the end of the Article, the 
regulation of fracking and climate change both present current, 
contentious issues that would benefit from more careful consideration 
of exit strategies. 
In Part II, we start from first principles and consider the basic 
features of exit. In separate sections, we explore the What, Who, When, 
Where, How, and Why of exit, identifying the key facets of exit in its 
many manifestations. We then address the normative aspect of exit 
strategies, exploring the different metrics one might use to measure 
success.  With these descriptive and normative foundations in place, 
Part III turns to design, developing a typology of the different exit 
strategies for government and regulated/beneficiary parties. Drawing 
from concrete examples, we create a matrix framework for describing 
basic categories of exit and explore the political economy behind the 
groupings of exit strategies in the matrix boxes. 
 
mandatory requirement); Hon. Richard D. Cudahy, Electric Deregulation after California: Down 
but Not Out, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 333 (2002) (discussing the California electric deregulation event, 
which infamously failed); Steven Ferry, Exit Strategy: State Legal Discretion to Environmentally 
Sculpt the Deregulating Electric Environment, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 109 (2002) (discussing 
“exit fees” as part of an exit strategy for moving industry and consumers toward renewable energy); 
Ron Haskins, What Works is Work: Welfare Reform and Poverty Reduction, 4 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL. 
30 (2009) (reviewing the techniques and impacts of “workfare” welfare reform of the 1990s).  Most 
of the exit-oriented work in regulatory contexts focused on the deregulation movement of the 1990s 
and subsequent reregulation movements. See generally Project: Regulatory Reform: A Survey of 
the Impact of Reregulation and Deregulation on Selected Industries and Sectors, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 
461 (1995) (symposium issue covering deregulation in the energy, trucking, communications, food, 
financial, and other industries). Deregulation, which presents a host of political and governance 
issues, is in our view only one form of regulatory exit.     
 13.  In her work examining how to design regulation ex ante to accommodate growth in scale, 
measured in terms of number of sources of harm being regulated, Professor Hannah Wiseman 
recognizes the possibility of “ratcheting down regulation when it appears that the activity produces 
fewer harms as it grows” and kindly acknowledges an early draft of this Article as expanding on 
that theme. Hannah J. Wiseman, Remedying Regulatory Diseconomies of Scale, 94 B.U. L. REV. 
235, 238 n.2, 303 (2014). Her work “focus[es] on the growth of harms in a negative direction[—
]when society might have inadequate opportunities to bargain for harm reduction and regulation 
does not change.” Id. at 238. Nevertheless, several of the mechanisms she describes for allowing 
regulation to more or less automatically ratchet up as harms increase when scale grows can also 
work in the other direction as harms decrease, and thus would qualify for our purposes as exit 
strategies.       
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Despite the breadth and endless number of exit examples, our 
simple model explains why we see particular types of exit strategies in 
certain settings and not others. In Part IV, we apply the framework to 
the case studies of climate change and the emerging regulatory 
challenge of fracking to demonstrate its usefulness in practice. After 
proposing a set of guidelines for policy makers to use in their choice of 
exit strategy in the program design phase, we conclude by describing a 
new exit strategy model: a hybrid approach we call “Lookback Exit.”14 
Exit is a vast and central, yet largely unexplored aspect of 
governance. By providing the first full account, we demonstrate why 
exit warrants focused research and theory in its own right, create a 
framework for the analysis of exit issues, and identify the key questions 
for future research. Doing so provides important insights not only into 
the administrative practice we see around us today, but also for the 
design of new programs to manage emerging issues. Thinking clearly 
about exit before entering a relationship is important to people in 
settings as varied as college course loads and as sophisticated as 
venture capital investing. It is long past the time for government to 
think clearly about it, too. 
II. DEFINING EXIT 
This Section systematically explores the key attributes of 
regulatory exit strategies. Because this is the first article to treat exit 
as a complex, dynamic phenomenon, we lay a foundation by setting out 
in clear fashion the What, Who, When, Where, How, and Why of exit in 
the administrative state. We then step back to consider how one should 
evaluate the success of an exit strategy. 
A. Key Attributes of Exit 
1. What is exit? 
For a phenomenon as widespread in the administrative state as 
exit, a useful definition must be broad enough to encompass exit’s many 
 
 14.  As the name suggests, our proposal builds off the Obama Administration’s term for 
retrospective regulatory review, Lookback Regulation, under which “agencies shall consider how 
best to promote retrospective analysis of rules that may be outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or 
excessively burdensome, and to modify, streamline, expand, or repeal them in accordance with 
what has been learned.” Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011). For descriptions 
of Regulatory Lookback and previous administrations’ retrospective regulatory review initiatives, 
see Reeve Bull, Building a Framework for Governance: Retrospective Review and Rulemaking 
Petitions, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 265, 277–86 (2015); Cary Coglianese, Moving Forward with 
Regulatory Lookback, 30 YALE J. ON REG. ONLINE 57, 58–59 (2013). 
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manifestations, yet sufficiently precise to differentiate exit from other 
mechanisms of administrative process and policy. We define exit as the 
intentional, significant reduction in governmental intervention initiated 
at a particular time under specified processes and conditions. This 
definition includes actions ranging from welfare reform to electricity 
deregulation. As we describe below, different parties can initiate exit in 
a variety of governance contexts, and exit strategies have temporal, 
procedural, and substantive dimensions. 
2. Who exits? 
At its most basic level, exit can take two very different forms, 
presenting opposite sides of the same coin. On the face side, we are all 
familiar with the notion of government eliminating a program through 
blunt deregulation. When the government shuts down an electric utility 
rate-setting program, for example, it exits this domain, leaving 
electricity pricing to market forces. We call this and other ways in which 
government reduces its intervention Government Exit. In many cases, 
Government Exit will not be absolute. A regulated party will still feel 
other aspects of governmental influence after Government Exit. In the 
context of electricity rate-setting deregulation, for example, firms will 
still be constrained by antitrust laws. Nor must Government Exit 
always take the form of wholesale deregulation. For example, a 
regulatory threshold defining the class of regulated entities could be 
relaxed but not entirely eliminated, or the intensity of permitting 
standards and procedures could be reduced, as is done through the 
general permit mechanism.15 
There is equally a tail side of the coin, where the party receiving 
benefits or subject to government restraint may also exit. Thus a party 
may no longer be eligible to apply for welfare benefits or perhaps may 
choose to no longer receive benefits. A factory subject to emissions 
controls, for example, may choose to reduce its emissions to a level 
where the restriction no longer covers it. We call this Party Exit, and it 
often plays a central role in regulatory and entitlement program design. 
Importantly, Government Exit and Party Exit are related; 
indeed, one often depends upon the other. Government may set the 
standards for benefits eligibility or thresholds for regulatory 
supervision (the boundary conditions for coverage), but the choice to 
exit in these settings—whether or not to modify behavior—ultimately 
 
 15.  See generally Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, The Permit Power Revisited: The Theory and 
Practice of Regulatory Permits in the Administrative State, 64 DUKE L.J. 133 (2014) (discussing 
the range of permitting models from general permitting to specific permitting). 
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lies in the control of the regulated or benefited party. For example, if a 
regulatory program defines a threshold for determining which 
businesses are “in” the program, such as number of employees or 
annual gross revenue, businesses might take measures to move “out” of 
the program. A farmer may choose to exit a subsidy program rewarding 
conservation of wetlands, for example, if eligibility requirements also 
prohibit the use of pesticides. 
3. When does exit occur? 
Our definition of exit posits that exit occurs at a particular time. 
For Government Exit, this happens in one of three ways. First, 
Government Exit can occur when a predetermined threshold is met. 
This would include the date in sunset legislation that expires after a set 
period of years, such as the Bush-era tax breaks.16 Second, the program 
may end when a predetermined funding limit has been met. For 
example, $250,000 might be allocated for flood relief, and when the 
money runs out the program ends.17 Alternatively, a program may cease 
to operate when a specified threshold has been met, such as the federal 
tax credits for hybrid and electric cars that ended once a specified 
number of eligible cars had been sold.18 Finally, Government Exit may 
occur after a political event. Political considerations may eliminate 
funding of a program or even outright kill a program as part of a budget 
bill.19 As described in Part IV, this is often a messy form of exit, a post 
hoc decision made after the program has commenced. 
Party Exit generally occurs in two scenarios, involuntary and 
voluntary. Involuntary Party Exit occurs when an objective or 
published and predetermined threshold has been met. This may be 
automatic. A welfare recipient becomes ineligible, for example, if he or 
 
 16.  Arlette Saenz, What Happens If the Bush Tax Cuts Expire?, ABC NEWS (Dec. 13, 2012), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/fiscal-cliff-bush-tax-cuts-expire/story?id=17907791 
[http://perma.cc/L47K-8YDS] (“The tax cuts in question were initially proposed by President 
George W. Bush and passed by Congress in 2001 and 2003, but the law came with a 2010 expiration 
date.”). 
 17.  FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. COMPLIANCE EXAMINATION MANUAL § V-6.1, 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/compliance/manual/5/V-6.1.pdf (Jan. 2014) [http://perma.cc/ 
BS6Z-ETM2]  (for single-family and two- to four-family dwellings and other residential buildings 
located in a participating community under the regular program, the maximum cap is $250,000). 
 18.  The hybrid car income-tax credit was limited to 60,000 cars per manufacturer while the 
credit for plug-in cars extends to 200,000 per manufacturer. John Voelcker, When Do Electric Car 
Tax Credits Expire?, GREEN CAR REPORTS (July 15, 2013), http://www.greencarreports.com/news/ 
1085549_when-do-electric-car-tax-credits-expire [http:// perma.cc/DCC3-SVHL]. 
 19.  As discussed infra, this has been a popular strategy for opponents to the Affordable Care 
Act. See, e.g., Chris Jacobs, Defunding Obamacare: The Next Best Option, THE HERITAGE 
FOUNDATION ISSUE BRIEF #4002 (2013). 
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she tests positive for drugs.20 It may also occur following a subjective 
decision, when a party’s status must be determined by an official, such 
as whether a recipient of disability funds is deemed no longer eligible. 
Voluntary Party Exit also can occur in regulatory and funding 
programs, either at the time a threshold has been satisfied, such as a 
stationary source no longer emitting the minimal level of pollutants for 
coverage,21 or upon request and government assent, such as a state 
seeking release from supervision under the Voting Rights Act.22 
Exit can also be gradual, with incremental steps resulting in a 
reduction of governmental intervention. As described below, for 
example, the Clean Air Act provides for discrete release from particular 
mandates as a region’s ozone pollution gradually improves from 
Extreme and Severe Nonattainment to Moderate and Marginal 
Nonattainment.23 
4. Where does exit occur? 
As the simple examples described above make clear, exit is not 
just about deregulation or defunding programs. Exit takes place in 
three general settings. 
The first is Takeover. Here, the government steps in and 
effectively takes ownership or control for a limited period of time. This 
was most obvious in the industry bailouts of 2008, where the 
government acted as a silent or active investor, taking an ownership 
interest in companies of critical national importance to economic 
stability. An example from outside the administrative state involves 
invasion, where the goals require air strikes or military intervention by 
troops on the ground. Takeover can also occur when the federal or state 
government steps in to take control of an insolvent or corrupt local 
 
 20.  See KEVIN B. ZEESE, DRUG TESTING LEGAL MANUAL § 1:7 (2d. ed. 1996) (nine states have 
mandatory drug testing requirements for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families recipients 
under certain circumstances).  
 21.  The use of mandated pollution control technologies under the Clean Air Act’s PSD 
program, for example, only applies to facilities emitting more than one hundred tons per year in 
one of twenty-eight source categories listed by the EPA. If a source emits ninety-nine tons per year, 
it is not covered by this part of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (2012). 
 22.  Michael James Burns, Shelby County v. Holder and the Voting Rights Act: Getting the 
Right Answer with the Wrong Standard, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 227, 235 (2012) (“Under section 4(a) 
of the VRA, a covered jurisdiction could become exempt from the requirement of section 5 
preclearance by bringing an action for declaratory judgment in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia.”).  
 23.  42 U.S.C. § 7512(a)(1) (2012); Shari R. DeSalvo, Ozone Transport and the Clean Air Act: 
The Answers are Blowin’ in the Wind, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 355, 364 (1998) (“Control regimes are 
established for each category; more polluted areas are required to take more and stronger 
measures to reduce VOC and NOx emissions, and are given more time to attain the standard.”).  
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government.24 In each of these situations and many others, there is a 
clear understanding from the outset that the intervention will not be 
permanent. At some point, the government will want its funds back, its 
soldiers re-deployed, authority returned to local officials. As we will 
discuss later, in these settings there is a shared understanding that the 
responsibilities required in a takeover are not the traditional roles of 
government. As a result, a government takeover should be a short-lived 
experience and the exit strategy prominently considered before the 
takeover occurs. 
The second common exit category concerns Benefits. The 
government offers access to public resources, subsidies, or other values 
to classes of individuals or companies in an administrative process. 
Government Exit occurs when the government ceases to provide 
benefits. Government may “reinvent” welfare and eliminate certain 
programs, or tighten conditions for eligibility.25 It may terminate 
particular resource subsidy programs,26 or it may write tax incentives 
out of the internal revenue code.27  Party Exit arises in this setting as 
well, as parties find they can no longer meet eligibility requirements or 
choose for other reasons not to receive government benefits. Exit in 
these circumstances may seem entirely appropriate. The goal, after all, 
is to provide benefits for particular ends––perhaps creating a safety net 
for those in poverty so they can find a better paying job, or providing an 
incentive for particular types of investments or resource extraction. As 
we discuss later, through this vantage, exit actually should be seen as 
a good thing, appropriate when the program’s goals have been met. 
The last context in which exit commonly occurs is Regulation.  
In this form of exit, the agency restricts the behavior of third parties 
(private and/or public) and sets criteria for coverage under the program. 
Government Exit occurs when the regulatory program is eliminated, 
defunded, or scaled back. Party Exit occurs when the regulated parties 
 
 24.  See, e.g., Matt Helms, Nancy Kaffer & Stephen Henderson, Detroit Files for Bankruptcy, 
Setting Off Battles with Creditors, Pensions, Unions, DETROIT FREE PRESS, (July 19, 2013, 7:47 
AM), http://www.freep.com/article/20130718/NEWS01/307180107/Detroit-bankruptcy-filing-
Kevyn-Orr-emergency-manager [http://perma.cc/ 59MV-C6PG] (describing role played by state-
appointed emergency manager). 
 25.  See, e.g., Gary Burtless & R. Kent Weaver, Reinventing Welfare… Again: The Latest 
Version of Reform Needs a Tune-up, BROOKINGS (Winter 1997), http://www.brookings.edu/ 
research/articles/1997/12/winter-welfare-burtless [http://perma.cc/29YH-FR6S].  
 26.  See Matthew Philips, Wind Energy Companies Prepare for Tax Credit’s End, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESS WEEK (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-01-09/wind-energy-
companies-prepare-for-tax-credits-end [http://perma.cc/KEM4-4BL9] (discussing the potential end 
of the tax credit for wind energy companies). 
 27.  See, e.g., Repeal of Geographically Targeted Economic Development Area Tax Incentives, 
STATE OF CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BOARD, https://www.ftb.ca.gov/businesses/ 
Economic_Development_Incentives/Repeal_of_GTEDA.shtml [http://perma.cc/8PRQ-EC26]. 
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no longer meet the requirements for supervision. For example, an 
industrial source that drops production of solid waste below 100 kg falls 
outside the administrative reach of RCRA.28 When parties are released 
from regulatory strictures, the message is that they no longer pose a 
significant concern to the public (whether through pollution, market 
manipulation, hiring practices, etc.) and thus no longer need 
supervision to direct their behavior. As we discuss later, however, 
regulatory exit thus presents two concerns. The first is that of 
premature exit, where the party should still be regulated and releasing 
it will exacerbate the underlying problem that led to regulation in the 
first place. The second is that of tardy exit, where overregulation of too 
many parties or by too many requirements leads to reductions in social 
welfare. 
5. How does exit occur? 
Exit can occur as a binary “toggle switch” of the administrative 
state. In Government Exit, either an agency occupies an area or it does 
not. Jurisdictional and other prescribed boundaries define the scope of 
coverage. In Party Exit, a party is either in or out, above or below the 
threshold.  This on/off vision of exit is oversimplified.  In practice, the 
boundaries of exit can often prove indistinct, even turbulent. It is more 
accurate, therefore, to think of exit in terms of a spectrum, as shown in 
the diagram below.   
 
De Facto Exit 
Full Exit  <——————————————————>  No Exit 
Ratchet Exit 
 
The clearest example, of course, is what we call Full Exit. Here, 
the program or action has bright line boundaries and effectively 
operates as a binary system, with a party either in or out. From the 
vantage point of Government Exit, sunsetting a subsidy program means 
that after a certain date the government will no longer provide specific 
benefits, no matter how worthy the applicant. California’s deregulation 
of the wholesale electricity sector provides a regulatory example of Full 
Government Exit.29 Full Exit can occur with Party Exit, as well. If a 
facility emits less than one hundred tons of carbon dioxide per year, 
under the EPA’s “tailoring rule” it is no longer subject to the strictures 
 
 28.  40 C.F.R. § 261.5 (2015).  
 29.  See infra, Section II.A. 
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of the Clean Air Act. A party can therefore modify its behavior to exit 
the regime or stay in.30 
It is important to note that Full Exit does not mean that the 
party is therefore free of all governmental restraints. There may well 
be other mandates in place such as the common law or other statutory 
regimes. A facility no longer covered by the Clean Air Act, for example, 
will still be subject to state environmental laws or to nuisance suits if 
its pollution causes harm. 
At the other end of the range lies No Exit. Like the existentialist 
play by Sartre,31 this category covers administrative programs where 
there is no expectation that the problem will be solved. Absent 
regulation, problems will reappear, so exit is simply not a viable option. 
For Government Exit, core military programs administered by the 
Department of Defense fall under this category. It would be nice, but 
hard to imagine, a setting in the near future where we do not require 
an army or navy. Providing a military remains a core function of 
government. For Party Exit, speed limits on highways provide an 
example. Particularly skillful drivers are not allowed to exit speed limit 
restrictions. Parties cannot choose whether or not to be subject to limits 
based on how fast they can competently drive.32 
Between the extremes of Full Exit and No Exit are at least two 
types of partial exit. In these settings, the form of administrative action 
changes and edges toward exit. This is most obvious with Ratchet Exit. 
Here, Full Exit is clearly in sight but movement is stepwise, with 
identifiable steps gradually reducing the government’s role. In 
Government Exit, this occurs when the government starts to draw down 
its level of management control after taking a major stake in banks or 
corporations during the recession. Over time, there is a decreasing level 
of governmental intervention. In Party Exit, this occurs when a party 
moves from one discrete regulatory category to another within the 
broader regulatory scheme. The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments 
changed the nonattainment programs for ozone (smog) from a binary 
system of attainment or nonattainment to ratcheted stages of 
noncompliance. Depending on the level of nonattainment, a party can 
move from the most egregious level of noncompliance, Severe (which 
requires clean fuels programs and many other restrictions), to Moderate 
(enhanced inspection and monitoring of vehicles), to Marginal 
 
 30.  Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 40 
C.F.R. §§ 70.2, 71.2 (2015).  
 31.  JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, NO EXIT (Stuart Gilbert trans., Vintage Int’l ed. 1989) (depicting an 
afterlife in which three deceased characters are punished by being locked into a room together for 
eternity).  
 32.  Although choosing not to drive at all would provide a form of exit in this setting. 
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(entailing fewer restrictions), and ultimately to Full Exit (with no 
strictures). At each step toward compliance, as the district cleans its 
air, it faces fewer and fewer mandates and restrictions. 
Another form of partial exit occurs through De Facto Exit, where 
a party is formally subject to government strictures but not in practice. 
Thus a prosecutor may decide not to enforce certain laws as a matter of 
policy (e.g., not enforcing marijuana laws).33 There is no de jure exit in 
this setting because the laws are still on the books and, at any moment, 
the government could select someone to prosecute. However, the 
government has de facto exited the regulatory scheme by declining to 
enforce it. Similarly, a regulatory permit might define a term of ten 
years, but all the permitted activities and conditions are accomplished 
within three years. The permit is still alive, but the relationship 
between permitting agency and permittee is over for all practical 
purposes. 
All four types of exit are at work under the Endangered Species 
Act (ESA).34 The ESA protects imperiled species by authorizing the Fish 
and Wildlife Service to identify species that are “threatened” or 
“endangered.”35 Wildlife species that are “listed” receive protection 
under the statute through, among other mechanisms, a prohibition 
against harming individual species members.36 Full Exit occurs when a 
species is “delisted.” The population has recovered to a level where it is 
no longer endangered or threatened,37 and consequently its regulatory 
status goes from receiving the full protections of the Act to no protection 
at all (at least not under the ESA). Ratchet Exit can occur any number 
of ways. A species can be designated as threatened instead of 
endangered, providing lesser protections.38 Or a landowner can apply 
for a permit allowing a specified quantity of incidental “takes” of 
protected species.39 The permitted activity, however, could be completed 
well before the permit expires, creating a De Facto Exit. For example, 
the permit term for the construction of a building might be stated as 
ten years, while the building construction might be completed in three 
years. Finally, there is effectively No Exit for so-called conservation-
reliant species. These are listed species for which the threats in the wild 
 
 33.  See, e.g., Kevin Johnson & Raju Chebium, Justice Dept. Won’t Challenge State Marijuana 
Laws, USA TODAY, (Aug. 29, 2013 6:29 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ 
nation/2013/08/29/justice-medical-marijuana-laws/2727605/ [http://perma.cc/9ZBW-WMDY]. 
 34.  See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012). 
 35.  Id. § 1533(a). 
 36.  Id. § 1538(a)(1)(B).   
 37.  Id. § 1533(g).  
 38.  Id. § 1533(d).  
 39.  Id. § 1539(a).  
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are so prevalent and intractable that the species cannot survive without 
active intervention.40 The few California Condors living in the wild, for 
example, are periodically trapped by wildlife agencies so their blood can 
be filtered to reduce dangerously high blood-lead levels caused by eating 
carcasses with lead shot.41 
6. Why exit? 
The preceding sections have explored the practice of exit in the 
administrative state—what is exit, who exits, when they exit, where 
they exit, and how they exit. In this concluding section of Part II, we 
examine why government or parties exit—what policy objective does 
exit serve? 
Any consideration of Government Exit must start with the fact 
of government intervention in the first place. Exit only makes sense in 
the context of exiting from somewhere. It might be a regulatory scheme, 
a benefits program, a pilot project, or some other initiative. Unless the 
intention is for the governmental activity to continue indefinitely (a 
prospect considered above when discussing No Exit), the possibility of 
exit is inevitable. 
The most obvious reason for exit is “mission accomplished”—the 
government intervention has achieved its intended purpose. This is 
obvious in the case of delisting an endangered species that has 
recovered or withdrawing control of a corporation, taken over during a 
financial crisis, that can now operate on its own. The opposite occurs, 
as well, where the program has clearly failed and needs to be ended. 
New information may come to light, or social norms might change over 
time, suggesting the initial governmental intervention or program was 
unnecessary, excessive, or counterproductive. Official school 
segregation that ended before the Brown v. Board of Education decision 
provides one example.42 
Usually, though, success is less clear-cut but exit still seems 
appropriate. One obvious reason is scarce resources. There is only so 
much money to spend and exiting a program frees up resources for other 
competing needs. This is a common situation facing philanthropies, 
which fund worthwhile programs but do not wish to do so indefinitely. 
Changed conditions can make the government intervention less 
pressing. This may be driven by changing politics. In the rough-and-
 
 40.  E.g., J. Michael Scott et al., Recovery of Imperiled Species Under the Endangered Species 
Act: The Need for a New Approach, 7 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV’T 383, 386 (2005).  
 41.  E.g., Susan Milius, Lead Stymies Condor Comeback, SCIENCE NEWS, Jul. 28, 2012, at 16.  
 42.  Anne Richardson Oakes, From Pedagogical Sociology to Constitutional Adjudication: The 
Meaning of Desegregation in Social Science Research and Law, 14 MICH. J. RACE & L. 61, 98 (2008). 
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tumble between and within the Executive and Legislative branches, 
certain constituencies may be ascendant and demanding attention for 
their causes while other constituencies are losing sway. 
B. Defining Exit Success 
Given that exit will be desirable in many settings, another 
consideration, more normative than descriptive, is how to measure the 
success of an exit strategy and assess whether one type of exit is 
superior to another for a given context. We suggest there are four basic 
metrics of exit success. 
Stickiness.  Successful exit should ensure the persistence of the 
desired behavior change or condition over time once the regime has 
ended or the party has exited. For example, if a species is delisted, it 
should not need the protections of the ESA soon after. When a tax credit 
is removed, the hope is that it has spurred sufficient investment in the 
desired sector. The rapid reappearance of the problem that justified 
intervention in the first place is a sign of poorly planned or premature 
exit. Conversely, while exit can be premature, it can also be too late. We 
want parties in the program to avoid developing dependence and 
inability to exit. This is one of the classic criticisms of the welfare 
state.43 
Avoided Capture. A related though different challenge lies in 
capture––where parties subject to agency oversight unduly influence 
agency decisions for their private profit. We see this in benefits 
programs where subsidies endure for long periods of time because the 
beneficiaries exercise political influence that hinders Government 
Exit.44 Regulated parties can also lobby to prevent Government Exit to 
ensure continued supply of a competitive benefit. The inability of city 
governments to deregulate taxi medallion systems, for example, 
ensures that supply remains limited and prices remain higher than 
would be the case without such a system.45 Public choice theory provides 
the classic explanation for why such support programs for concentrated 
interests effectively operate as No-Exit regimes.46 Taxi drivers, 
 
 43.  E.g., Julie A. Nice, Welfare Servitude, 1 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 340, 341 (1994) 
(citations omitted) (discussing the criticisms of welfare, including dependency).  
 44.  See generally Huber, supra note 10 (describing capture in the context of public property 
used for private purposes). 
 45.  See Katrina Miriam Wyman, Problematic Private Property: The Case of the New York 
Taxicab Medallions, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 125, 128 (2013) (“By inflating fares and limiting the 
availability of taxis, expensive licenses likely harm taxi consumers . . . .”).  
 46.  See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 34 (1998) (Regulatory “goods” demanded by organized subgroups of citizenry 
dominate over regulatory interests of individual voters).  
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ranchers, and other concentrated beneficiaries of agency programs 
lobby hard to keep their preferred status. Thus one metric of exit 
strategy success is avoiding political capture by concentrated interests. 
Flexibility to changing circumstances.  Government regulatory 
and benefits programs evolve over time in response to new information, 
shifting political coalitions, and other changed circumstances. Welfare 
reform, for example, has altered and continues to alter benefits over 
time to reflect changing social norms and fiscal conditions. As a 
component of regulatory and benefits programs, exit strategies should 
incorporate sufficient flexibility to evolve as well. Indeed, the rise of 
adaptive management as a regulatory and benefits program 
implementation method demands exit flexibility over time.47 
Signaling and rhetorical power. Although exit often stands  
silently in the background as parties move along the spectrum, in some 
cases exit can send a powerful message. Full Exit can send the message 
to the public that the mission has been accomplished or to the 
beneficiary community that no further help is at hand and the parties 
have to make do for themselves. Equally, the impossibility of exit, 
reflected in an official No Exit program policy, can communicate to 
other parties the seriousness of the government’s commitment to a 
regulatory program. When appropriate, then, exit should send a 
message to the regulated community or the public. 
 
 47.  The idea of adaptive management is that agencies should be free to make more decisions, 
but that the timing of those decisions is spread out into a continuous process that makes 
differentiating between the “front end” and the “back end” of decisionmaking much less relevant. 
Rather than make one grand decision and move on, agencies employing adaptive management 
engage in a program of iterative decisionmaking following a structured multistep protocol: (1) 
definition of the problem, (2) determination of goals and objectives for management, (3) 
determination of the baseline, (4) development of conceptual models, (5) selection of future actions, 
(6) implementation and management actions, (7) monitoring, and (8) evaluation and return to step 
(1). Formal, time-limited public-participation junctures, such as the notice-and-comment process 
of conventional APA-style administrative rulemaking, are not a component of adaptive 
management; rather, public input is derived through an emphasis on more loosely defined 
processes for “stakeholder involvement” and multiparty “collaborative planning.” With deep roots 
in natural resources management theory, the adaptive management protocol has begun to make 
inroads in public lands management in particular, though it has been applied or proposed in other 
policy contexts including pollution control, financial regulation, environmental impact assessment, 
public health and safety, civil rights, and social welfare. Adaptive management programs must 
incorporate flexible exit strategies every bit as much as they incorporate flexible regulation and 
benefits. See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive 
Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 16–18 (2014) (explaining the adaptive management 
decisionmaking process). 
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III. DESIGNING EXIT STRATEGIES 
As should be clear by now, exit in the administrative state is a 
wide-ranging and multifaceted phenomenon. Despite the breadth and 
endless number of exit examples, we argue that a simple model can 
prove analytically useful, explaining why we see particular types of exit 
strategies in certain settings and not others. This holds true for both 
Government Exit and Party Exit. 
Our model involves a 2 x 2 matrix. The first dimension measures 
when the exit strategy design decision is made. Ex ante design decisions 
occur at the front end of the intervention, during the design of the 
program itself and prior to its implementation. Ex post exit design 
occurs after the intervention has begun. The second dimension reflects 
the clarity of conditions necessary for exit to occur, regardless of 
whether they are designed ex ante or ex post. Are the exit requirements 
clear? This dimension runs from Transparent to Opaque. 
Much is obviously lost when examining as complicated a 
phenomenon as regulatory exit along just two dimensions. This is by no 
means a comprehensive model. Nevertheless, this simple framework 
reveals a great deal of what really drives the design and operation of 
exit in the administrative state. 
A. Ex Ante versus Ex Post 
While there are many reasons for exit, a central concern for both 
Government Exit and Party Exit concerns when the conditions for exit 
are determined. The time at which parties understand the 
consequences of exit has an important influence on behavior in a wide 
range of legal settings. This is as true for spouses contemplating 
separation and divorce, or for parties deciding whether to breach a 
contract and bargain in the shadow of the law, as it is for government 
takeovers, benefits, and regulatory programs. 
In ex ante settings, the relevant decision-maker establishes the 
process and conditions for exit before engagement. For Government 
Exit, this is often achieved through “sunsetting,” which describes when 
there is a determination at program creation that the program will 
automatically expire on a certain date unless there is explicit 
reauthorization.48 The assault weapons ban and Bush-era tax cuts 
 
 48.  For a critique of sunsetting, see Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PENN. L. 
REV. 1007 (2011). 
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provide two recent examples.49 As the exit date approaches, there may 
be sufficient political support to prevent this from happening, but it 
requires action on the part of those who wish to block the exit path. 
For Party Exit, the conditions are known before entering the 
program and a party can choose whether to remain within the program. 
Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, for example, 
wastes that are reused in the same process within ninety days are 
exempted from the statute’s requirements for waste disposal.50 For 
business reasons, a manufacturing plant may or may not choose to 
make use of the recycling exemption, but it understands the option 
before designing its production process. Ex ante exit design also could 
employ Ratchet Exit techniques by establishing tiers of regulatory 
thresholds defining different levels of intervention, thus providing 
incentives for Party Exit. Ex ante design can also establish a No Exit 
regime. Thus, the Selective Service program requires all eighteen-year-
olds to register and does not allow deregistration. 
In ex post settings, the process and conditions for exit are 
established after engagement has commenced. The classic example of 
this for Government Exit is after a military invasion (when the 
parameters for leaving may not be clear even after exit). In the 
administrative state, an obvious example may be found in deregulation, 
such as when a political decision is made to end a program with no 
sunset provisions, as happened in California with the deregulation of 
wholesale electricity pricing.51 Or Congress may choose to change the 
conditions in mid-stride, such as welfare reform that makes it harder to 
obtain coverage.52 Ex post exit can also occur more subtly, as sometimes 
happens behind the scenes when Congress engages in “zero-budgeting” 
through appropriation bills, forbidding existing programs to spend any 
money pursuing their goals.53 
 
 49.  Michael G. Lenett, Taking a Bite Out of Violent Crime, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 573, 609 
(1995) (discussing the features of the law, including the sunset provision after ten years); Saenz, 
supra note 16. 
 50.  See 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(e) (2015); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 906 F.2d 729, 741 (D.C. Cir. 
1990). 
 51.  Robert B. Martin, III, Sherman Shorts Out: The Dimming of Antitrust Enforcement in 
the California Electricity Crisis, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 275 (2003) (discussing the deregulation of 
electricity pricing in California).  
 52.  Michele E. Kenney, A Pitfall of Judicial Deference: Equal Protection of the Laws Fails 
Women in Lewis v. Thompson, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 525, 525 (2002) (discussing the “Welfare Reform 
Act” and its limitations on coverage for immigrant populations).  
 53.  Jerry Gray, Senate Backs Moratorium in Species Act, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 9, 1995), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/09/us/senate-backs-moratorium-in-species-act.html 
[http://perma.cc/34NW-SX4P].  
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B. Transparent versus Opaque 
This dimension measures how difficult it is to determine 
whether the conditions for exit have been satisfied—how clearly the 
pathway to exit is mapped. A number of factors determine this level of 
clarity. Are the exit requirements objective and clear, or subjective and 
murky? Does the burden of proof rest with the government or the other 
party? The clarity of thresholds for coverage of regulated parties such 
as age, income, emissions, number of employees, or weekly hours 
worked, for example, is often a necessary precondition of what we call 
Transparent Exit. Absent clearly articulated conditions, exit is more 
difficult to predict, in what we call Opaque Exit. 
It is important to note that this distinction turns not on the 
actual cost or ease of exiting, but on the perceived ease. One could have 
clear, objective conditions but very difficult exit opportunities because 
the requirements to leave the program are highly demanding either in 
terms of performance or the burden of proof. Transparent Exit means 
only that it is easy for parties to know precisely what exit will require. 
Hence the transaction costs of this determination are low, though the 
actual costs of exiting could be low or high. We are not suggesting that 
actual costs of exit do not matter, or that they are not part of the exit 
strategy design decision. Rather, the clarity of exit conditions will drive 
how easy it is for government and program participants to determine 
the costs and other demands of exit early on. 
To a certain extent, the Transparent/Opaque distinction tracks 
the well-known difference between rules and standards.54 In 
Transparent Exit conditions, for example, determining how exit is 
accomplished is made simple through rule-like thresholds and 
requirements. For Government Exit, a law with a sunset provision 
makes exit automatic. The program may be extended, but doing so 
requires political action. For Party Exit, programs with clear conditions 
for coverage make Transparent Exit prevalent. In child welfare 
programs, once you reach the age of eighteen, you are out.55 Farmers 
can choose whether or not to apply for or continue receiving price 
supports. The same is true for beneficiaries of resource extraction 
 
 54.  See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Catalogs, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 165, 166–67 
(2015) (“Rules come in handy for individuals trying to figure out whether their contemplated 
conduct is prohibited or permitted. The same kind of ex ante clarity is not readily available under 
standards, whose precise implications for a given course of action are determined by a court or an 
agency only after the fact.”). 
 55. See Keely A. Magyar, Betwixt and Between but Being Booted Nonetheless: A 
Developmental Perspective on Aging Out of Foster Care, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 557, 559 (2006) 
(discussing the negative impacts of ending child welfare programs at age eighteen).  
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subsidies such as grazing. Either you meet the thresholds or you do not. 
Depending on the particular program, of course, the thresholds may be 
difficult to meet, but the possibility of exit is straightforward and the 
transaction costs of determining the rules of exit are low. 
For Opaque Exit, determining the conditions for departure can 
be more difficult and costly given the standard-based approach. 
Deregulation almost always entails political battles because certain 
vested interests will want to retain the status quo. Delisting a species 
from the ESA is a subjective determination regarding its “recovery” and 
demands a high evidentiary burden.56 Taking a site off of the National 
Priority List under Superfund functions in a similar manner, with 
judgments about “how clean is clean” varying from site to site.57 
Combining the two dimensions of timing and clarity allows us to 
create a simple matrix, shown in Figure 1. The boxes highlight 
representative examples of Government Exit and Party Exit. We 
readily admit that there will be examples that do not fit neatly in any 
single box. Nonetheless, these categories have significant analytic 
power in explaining why exit strategies look the way they do and are 
preferable in some settings but not in others. 
 
 
 
 56.  See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(a) (2012) (requiring the decision be based on “the best scientific 
and commercial data available”); § 1533(f) (outlining the requirement of recovery plans).  
 57.  See 40 C.F.R. § 300.425 (2015) (identifying the criteria, methods, and procedures used to 
establish priorities for remedial actions).  
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For a recent example, consider climate change regulation in the 
United States. Following the Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts 
v. EPA, the Environmental Protection Agency under the Obama 
administration set in motion the regulation of greenhouse gas 
emissions, but it faced a series of challenges.58 Greenhouse gases had 
never been regulated under the Clean Air Act before, so enabling 
regulations needed to be promulgated. Unfortunately, the statutory 
basis for these regulations mandated obtaining permits if new sources 
emitted more than one hundred tons of a pollutant per year. The 
problem is that greenhouse gases are much more common than 
conventional pollutants and this threshold would have required 
obtaining permits for hundreds of thousands of sources.59 To avoid this 
absurd result, EPA promulgated the “Tailoring Rule” which, among 
other things, establishes a threshold of one hundred thousand tons of 
greenhouse gas emissions per year for the permitting requirement. This 
presents a classic case of Mapped Exit not because exit is easy (indeed 
it will be quite difficult for large power plants), but because it is easy 
for parties to know at the outset what exit entails, and therefore the 
transaction costs of this decision are low.60 
And what are the design benefits of Mapped Exit using the 
metrics developed above in Part II.B? For starters, Mapped Exit is easy 
to assess and implement. In Party Exit, for example, the regulated 
party or beneficiary has satisfied a clear requirement or avoided 
thresholds that were explicitly anticipated. It also serves a clear 
purpose. The termination point for welfare based on income or time on 
the program makes sense—people should not receive welfare if they 
have sufficient income to support themselves, and a limited time for 
assistance creates an incentive to find work. 
Mapped exit should also ensure lower transaction costs of 
determining eligibility criteria. The actual costs of exiting could be 
high—for example, the costs associated with lowering emissions to exit 
a pollution control program—but the clarity of the conditions for exit 
allows government and program participants to identify exit costs and 
 
 58.  See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 59.  EPA, Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule 
(June 2010), http://www.epa.gov/apti/video/TailoringRule/tailoring.pdf [http://perma.cc/ VG9Q-
FJH9] (“Without the Tailoring Rule, there would have been millions of newly-subject sources and 
the costs would have been in the tens of billions of dollars.”). 
 60.  Clear thresholds such as this work both ways, in that a facility could move into rather 
than out from under regulation if its emissions rise. Hannah Wiseman has proposed embedding 
cumulative effects thresholds into regulatory programs, under which tighter regulatory controls 
on all sources of a harm would be triggered when the aggregate harm crosses a threshold. See 
Wiseman, supra note 13, at 279–83. Such a mechanism, presumably, would also work both ways, 
allowing Mapped Exit as aggregate harm levels fall below the threshold. 
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thereby engage in political discourse over whether the exit conditions 
should be changed. This provides a classic example of bargaining in the 
shadow of the law.61 
A program where the requirements for exit are well understood 
from the beginning sends a signal to the regulated and benefited 
communities that exit may be low cost or high cost depending on the 
specifics, but that the cost can be calculated up front and behavior 
changed accordingly. A predictable exit strategy, in other words, may 
provide incentives for parties to enter and comply with the regulatory 
or funding program conditions.62 
Mapped Exit also may help to reduce the danger of political 
capture and public choice pressures. In programs with a clear end date 
or conditions for exit, it should be more difficult for parties to expand 
benefits because it will require political capital to change the status quo. 
The requirements have already been set and any modifications will 
require new action. It is not easy to override a sunset provision, 
although, as will be seen with Uncertain Exit, it can be done. Low 
transaction costs associated with Mapped Exit may also be appropriate 
for a long program life with a fluid universe of covered parties, thus 
enhancing flexibility to changed circumstances. 
Equally, however, Mapped Exit also poses potential pitfalls. As 
described earlier, premature exit may worsen the very problem the 
governmental intervention was designed to prevent. A subtler problem 
can occur with arbitrary endpoints, when there has been inadequate 
consideration of what follows the sunset date. In the Acid Rain Trading 
Program under the Clean Air Act, there has been no planning for what 
happens after the gross emissions cap is met and there are still 
outstanding allowances otherwise eligible for trading.63 There is great 
concern in California over what happens to carbon credits after the cap-
and-trade program ends in 2020. What are allowances worth after that? 
 
 61.  See generally Robert Cooter, Stephen Marks, & Robert Mnookin, Bargaining in the 
Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982). 
 62.  Curt Bradley and Mitu Gulati have made a similar claim in support of customary 
international law, arguing that nations will be more likely to comply with customary law if they 
understand ex ante the costs of exit. Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from 
International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202, 269 (2010). See generally Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting 
Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579 (2005) (discussing exit provisions in international treaties and the 
reasons nations choose to exit treaties). 
 63.  Lesley McAllister, The End of the Acid Rain Program, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM 
BLOG (July 12, 2011), http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=1F5EE49E-E7EA-
6ACC-52991D37F7935E74 [http://perma.cc/7A67-L26E]. 
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A similar story could be told about production tax credits for renewable 
energy.64 
2. Uncertain Exit (Ex Ante & Opaque) 
In an Uncertain Exit, exit has been accounted for up front, but 
the specific conditions for exit are difficult to determine in practice. In 
these settings, subjective standards make the exit decision dependent 
on a discretionary judgment. In regulatory contexts, the regulated party 
must meet a high burden of proof to obtain exit approval from the 
agency and often incurs a correspondingly high cost to meet the 
conditions. 
Consider, for example, the practice of delisting a species under 
the ESA. A rare example among regulatory statutes, the very purpose 
of the ESA is to put itself out of business by promoting the recovery of 
listed species to the point of justifying delisting. Yet the delisting 
process has seldom been used.65 This ex ante strategy is subjective and 
requires a high burden of proof. Whether a species should be listed as 
endangered or threatened is based on five amorphous factors: (1) the 
present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of its 
habitat or range; (2) overutilization for commercial, recreational, 
scientific, or educational purposes; (3) disease or predation; (4) the 
inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or (5) other natural or 
manmade factors affecting its continued existence.66 The statute 
establishes a variety of regulatory programs designed to “conserve” 
listed species, including “all methods and procedures which are 
necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to the 
point at which the measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no 
longer necessary.”67 Delisting thus requires proving a negative—that 
the conditions leading to the listing no longer exist. This creates an 
Uncertain Exit situation because the requirements for exit are open-
ended and heavily fact-dependent. 
Uncertain Exit is well-suited to situations where there is a 
diversity of individual circumstances. Such diversity makes cookie-
 
 64.  Production Tax Credit for Renewable Energy, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, 
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/smart-energy-solutions/increase-renewables/production-tax-
credit-for.html [http://perma.cc/2VN9-N582] (discussing the disruptive effects of “off/on” expiration 
and renewal of the tax credits). 
 65.  See J. Michael Scott et al., By the Numbers, in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY: 
RENEWING THE CONSERVATION PROMISE 1 (Dale D. Goble et al., eds., 2006) (discussing the low 
number of recovered species). 
 66.  16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (2012). 
 67.  Id. § 1532(3). 
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cutter decisions difficult. Every species is different, hence there is no 
adequate formula for delisting based on, say, population numbers or 
geographic range. As a result, agency decisions in Uncertain Exit 
resemble adjudication with the associated costs/time required to assess 
evidence and policy concerns. Because of this case-by-case process, one 
would expect that Uncertain Exit will usually have high transaction 
costs. Concern exists over premature exit, but there is sufficient 
demand for clarity that broad ex ante provisions are adopted. 
While the conditions for Uncertain Exit are articulated at the 
outset, in practice their application is difficult to predict. Under the 
Superfund law, for example, many contaminated site remediations 
remain under indefinite operation and monitoring. Concerns over post-
exit conditions (is the site truly cleaned up?) lead to reluctance to 
approve exit.68 The discretion exercised by officials creates a pragmatic 
balance between subjective standards and objective rules. One might 
also expect Uncertain Exit to signal a strong commitment by 
government that parties can’t game the system and officials will need 
to be well and truly satisfied before approving exit. 
The above examples concern instances of intentionally designed 
Uncertain Exit, but Mapped Exit can transform into Uncertain Exit. 
The Bush-era Tax Cuts and the ban on assault weapons initially looked 
like examples of Mapped Exit because sunset provisions clearly state 
when the programs end. As the credibility of commitment was 
undermined, however, deadlines were extended and the conditions 
under which the legislature would eventually sunset the programs 
became unclear.69 This is also readily apparent in the case of grazing 
permits on public lands, where exit has become virtually meaningless. 
Permits are supposed to expire after ten years and be either 
reconsidered or offered to the public. But in practice, they are routinely 
renewed for the same users, often for decades.70 Exit was built-in ex 
ante as Mapped Exit, but capture has rendered the transparency 
ineffective and converted the exit regime to Uncertain Exit. This is 
equally true for mining and water rights.71 
 
 68.  See 40 C.F.R. § 300.420 (2015) (describing the “methods, procedures, and criteria the 
agency shall use to . . . evaluate releases”). 
 69.  Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296 (codified as amended in scattered sections of Title 26 of the 
U.S. Code). 
 70.  See generally Huber, supra note 10. 
 71.  See id. at 994–95. 
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3. Adaptive Exit (Ex Post & Transparent) 
Adaptive Exit occurs when clear standards are established for 
exit but not until after the program has commenced. This is most 
appropriate in the face of uncertainty. It may be the case that it 
appeared too difficult to predict the conditions for exit at the time of 
program creation, and so exit decisions were intentionally pushed off 
under the assumption that agencies will learn over time as the program 
develops. It may also be the case that the demand for exit is only 
recognized after creation of the program, when experience makes clear 
that the original mechanism or conditions for exit were inadequate, 
making exit either too easy or too difficult. 
Deregulation provides the bluntest example of Adaptive Exit, 
where the government simply departs from a formerly regulated area. 
Zero-budgeting, such as forbidding the use of agency funds to list 
endangered species, also presents an example of Adaptive Exit after the 
program has begun (although zero-budgeting tends to be a relatively 
short-lived strategy).72 Adaptive Exit can also be more sophisticated. 
The Clean Air Act, for example, requires regulation of “stationary 
sources.” In the classic case Chevron v. NRDC, an environmental group 
challenged the EPA’s decision to treat an entire facility as a stationary 
source (through so-called bubbling) rather than regulating each specific 
smokestack.73 This presented an example of efficiency-enhancing 
Adaptive Exit, since companies could avoid regulation if they increased 
emissions at one source so long as they reduced emissions from another 
source under the same facility bubble. 
California’s deregulation of electricity pricing provides an 
instructive example of Adaptive Exit gone wrong. In the 1990s, seeking 
to introduce competition into the electricity market and drive down 
prices, California changed its longstanding practice of regulating both 
wholesale and retail electricity rates. The state deregulated only the 
wholesale market, requiring the major investor-owned utilities to 
purchase their electricity through the new Power Exchange (“PX”).74 PX 
quickly developed into an active market and prices did drop initially. 
 
 72.  Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 
110 Stat. 1321, 1321-160 (1996). 
 73.  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 839–40 (1984). 
 74.  For a history of the California crisis, see Timothy P. Duane, Regulation’s Rationale: 
Learning from the California Energy Crisis, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 471, 480 (2002); James L. Sweeney, 
The California Electricity Crisis: Lessons for the Future 2 (2002) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://web.stanford.edu/~jsweeney/paper/Lessons%20for%20the%20Future.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/XFE3-GC79]. After California’s exit, the wholesale market was still regulated by 
FERC, but it chose not to intervene. 
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However, PX operated as a commodity market with significant 
volatility and was vulnerable to market manipulation. In the summer 
of 2000, wholesale electricity prices rose dramatically, due partly to 
manipulation by Enron and power generators. Utilities thus were 
caught in the pincers of buying expensive power wholesale in the PX 
and then being forced to sell at a loss at fixed rates to consumers (who 
still operated under a regulated market). As losses mounted, utilities 
lost their credit and Pacific Gas & Electric filed for bankruptcy. The 
state government rushed back into the market, with the Department of 
Water Resources spending almost nine billion dollars to purchase 
electricity in order to prevent further blackouts. Adaptive exit proved 
extremely costly for California, costing the governor his job. 
From a political economy perspective, Adaptive Exit should be 
less common than Mapped Exit or Uncertain Exit because it requires 
ex post action. This requires the marshaling of political interests to 
change the status quo, and thus can be politically volatile or costly. 
Even if there is a general acknowledgment that the original 
assumptions about exit have proven inadequate, that the program 
structure has proven too unwieldy or entrenched, or that the program 
was designed to adapt but has not, the costs of ex post change may prove 
high and potentially prohibitive. 
4. Messy Exit (Ex Post & Opaque) 
In the last category, Messy Exit, there are no––or poorly 
defined––ex ante conditions or mechanisms for exit, either because 
debating and designing exit had prohibitively high transaction costs or 
because the program was designed at inception as a No Exit strategy. 
As with Adaptive Exit, the demand for exit is recognized only after 
creation of the program. The difference is that, with Messy Exit, once 
the program has begun, either because of experience, politics, or 
changed conditions, demand for exit rises. But whether exit is even 
appropriate, much less under what conditions, leads to sharp 
disagreement. The highly politicized nature of the issue makes minor 
adjustments needed for Adaptive Exit difficult. Only blunt political 
intervention (in the case of Government Exit) or dramatic actions such 
as civil disobedience or offshoring (in the case of Party Exit) can create 
the opportunity for exit, and either way it comes at a high cost. 
Messy Exit has clearly been playing out in the drama 
surrounding the Affordable Care Act. At the time of passage, it was 
highly contested whether government should even enter the area, and 
there was no discussion of Government Exit. As a result, the program 
was portrayed as a No Exit scenario. The whole point of a national 
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health care system is to extend comprehensive coverage; thus there was 
no tolerance among supporters of the measure for discussing the terms 
of Government Exit. Following passage, the botched efforts by Tea 
Party activists in the House and Senate to force the de-funding or delay 
of the health care law in exchange for government spending provided a 
perfect example of a failed Messy Exit. 
Or consider the example of the ill-fated Project XL initiative by 
the EPA. The EPA started a national pilot program in 1995 that sought 
to encourage “superior environmental results [of companies and 
communities] beyond those that would have been achieved under 
current and reasonably anticipated future regulations or policies” 
among other criteria. EPA hoped that highlighting such eXcellence and 
Leadership (hence the acronym, “XL”) would identify strategies to 
achieve cleaner and cheaper environmental results than traditional 
reliance on regulations. As an incentive, the EPA offered the prospect 
of “regulatory flexibility” for participants. In practice, though, the EPA 
could not legally offer meaningful waivers or streamlined permits, and 
the program was shut down in 2002.75 In retrospect, Project XL provides 
an example of failed Messy Exit, where the features of ex post exit were 
never clearly set out because the EPA’s authority to offer such relief 
was itself uncertain. 
 
_____ 
 
Synthesizing the foregoing discussion of the categories of exit 
and their respective political economies, the chart below sets out the 
key factors influencing when we would expect to see the four categories 
of exit strategies in play. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 75.  See Allen Blackman & Janice Mazurek, The Cost of Developing Site-Specific 
Environmental Regulation: Evidence from EPA’s Project XL 1 (Resources for the Future Discussion 
Paper 99-35-REV, 2000). For the history of Project XL, see id.; Rena Steinzor, Regulatory 
Reinvention and Project XL: Does the Emperor Have Any Clothes?, 26 ENVT’L L. REPORTER 10527 
(1996). 
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Using the model’s descriptive power, we can now understand 
better the regulatory dynamic playing out in real time in the case of 
domestic climate change regulation. The application of the Clean Air 
Act’s New Source Performance Standards to electric utilities and 
petroleum refineries provides a clear example of Mapped Exit. Emission 
limits determine whether or not a facility is subject to the Act’s 
restrictions. The EPA has been in the process of promulgating 
regulations that will set forth the appropriate control technology for 
these sectors. The Tailoring Rule, described earlier,76 represents 
Adaptive Exit, where the threshold for exit is changed as a mid-course 
correction. Adaptive and Messy Exit are also in play, with Congress 
proposing legislation that would prohibit the EPA from addressing 
climate change, on the one hand, and the Supreme Court being asked 
to decide whether the EPA must address climate change, on the other.77 
IV. REGULATORY EXIT CHALLENGES AND INNOVATIONS 
In Part II, we set out the basic features of exit in the 
administrative state. In Part III, we created a model that identified four 
different types of exit strategies, examined the characteristics of each 
strategy, and described when they were most likely to occur. In this 
Part, we put the model to work, showing that it has both descriptive 
and predictive power. 
A. Applying the Model to Emerging Issues 
Our central contention is that exit strategies matter and thus 
legislatures and agencies should explicitly consider exit at the creation 
of new regulatory programs. We can show this by considering the 
importance of exit strategies to what has become one of the most 
controversial environmental issues across the nation––hydraulic 
fracturing techniques for enhanced recovery of oil and gas resources 
from deep shale formations, popularly known as fracking. Fracking 
involves drilling deep into impermeable shale deposits, extending the 
drilling zone outward through horizontal drilling, pumping fluids into 
the shale at high pressure to create cracks, thus allowing the previously 
trapped oil and gas to flow, and injecting sand and other “proppants” 
 
 76.  See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 77.  See, e.g., Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014); H.R. 4808, 113th Cong. 
(2014); H.R. 4813, 113th Cong. (2014).  
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into the cracks to keep them open.78  This technique has opened up vast 
new reserves of oil and gas in the United States, making natural gas 
less costly and contributing to economic development in drilling 
communities, greater national energy security, movement away from 
coal as an energy source, and a revival of the petrochemical industry.79 
Fracking has downsides familiar to oil and gas extraction in 
general, including air and water pollution, water usage, and induced 
ground tremors.80 Because fracking is both new and spreading fast 
throughout many parts of the nation, “[t]he magnitude of all these risks 
is uncertain and highly contested.”81 
Concerned with the threat of fracking to groundwater supplies, 
but eager to reap the economic benefits from drilling, the federal 
government and states have been wrestling over how best to regulate 
fracking activity.82 In 2005, Congress adopted an amendment to the 
Safe Drinking Water Act that expressly created an exemption for 
fracking from the definition of “underground injection.”83 This 
effectively left the management of fracking to the states. Many states 
have adopted fracking rules of some kind, choosing among twenty-five 
different regulatory elements within eight activities.84 The result has 
been a wide range of regulations, differing minimum standards, and 
case-by-case reviews of permit and variance applications, with some 
states imposing strict requirements and others regulating with a much 
lighter touch. 
Legal scholars have proposed their own approaches, ranging 
from information forcing and best management practices to permitting 
standards and negligence-based regulation.85 All of these proposals, 
 
 78.  See Thomas W. Merrill & David M. Schizer, The Shale Oil and Gas Revolution, Hydraulic 
Fracturing, and Water Contamination: A Regulatory Strategy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 145, 152–54 
(2013). 
 79.  See id. at 154–70. 
 80.  See id. at 170–80. 
 81.  Id. at 187. 
 82.  See NATHAN RICHARDSON ET AL., THE STATE OF STATE SHALE GAS REGULATION, 
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE 9 (June 2013), http://www.rff.org/rff/documents/RFF-Rpt-
StateofStateRegs_Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/68VJ-FMZU] (providing a comprehensive review of 
the different elements used in state regulations). 
 83.  See Merrill & Schizer, supra note 78, at 200–01. The so-called “Halliburton loophole” 
exempted “underground injection of fluids or propping agents (other than diesel fuels) pursuant to 
hydraulic fracturing operations related to oil, gas, or geothermal production activities.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2006).  
 84.  See RICHARDSON, ET AL., supra note 82, at 22–75 (describing various state fracking 
regulations).  
 85.  See, e.g., David A. Dana & Hannah J. Wiseman, A Market Approach to Regulating the 
Energy Revolution: Assurance Bonds, Insurance, and the Certain and Uncertain Risks of Hydraulic 
Fracturing, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1523, 1546–71 (2014) (market based regime); Merrill & Schizer, supra 
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however, have tackled the problem exclusively through the lens of 
regulatory entry; none considers how exit should factor into the design. 
In fact, all four types of exit strategy can and should be part of the 
analysis. Consider, for example, the following range of approaches. 
 
   A Mapped Exit strategy would establish clear quantitative 
thresholds for coverage, such as no fracking within 1,000 feet of 
public drinking water supply, injection of more than 1,000 kg of 
fracking fluid in a set time frame, etc. Fracking operations are 
either covered or not. 
 
   An Uncertain Exit strategy would rely on ex ante qualitative 
standards. Officials might require a permit unless the operation 
proves no likelihood of endangerment, or require a bond that will 
be released once an official has determined through post-drilling 
monitoring that there is no significant environmental impact. 
Only when such a standard has been met can the fracking 
company exit the regulatory regime. 
 
   An Adaptive Exit strategy would deliberately defer exit design 
for later based on lack of knowledge about the risks of fracking. 
The initial statute might have thresholds and standards, but 
over time the government may reach the conclusion that the 
level of regulation is excessively intense or costly, at which point 
the agency could introduce exclusions or graduated thresholds. 
The agency could equally make fracking regulations more 
demanding, creating additional requirements. 
 
   Finally, a Messy Exit strategy would be the result of no 
consideration being given to exit at all, likely for political 
reasons. The regulatory regime would look much like it does 
today, or even more restrictive. Exit would arise later in a major 
political conflict. A perceived energy crisis, for example, might 
lead to calls for relaxing rules or streamlining permits in order 
to extract more natural gas. Or the benefits of fracking could be 
deemed so substantial, but so restrained by the regulatory 
regime, that a complete overhaul is accomplished through 
politically-driven deregulation—more like a hacksaw compared 
to Adaptive Exit’s scalpel. 
 
 
note 78, at 201–57 (liability based regime); Hannah J. Wiseman, Hydraulic Fracturing and 
Information Forcing, 74 OHIO ST. L. J. FURTHERMORE 86, 89–97 (2013) (information based regime).  
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When applied to fracking, our model adds value for two reasons. 
First, considering exit changes the question asked from just “how much 
should we regulate?” to also include “how and when should we allow 
types of exit to occur and what should they look like?” Second, taking 
exit clearly into account ensures that the costs and benefits of different 
exit approaches, which necessarily play a part in the overall regulatory 
regime’s costs and benefits, will be explicitly assessed. Even if on the 
margins, this can be important. 
For example, the Mapped Exit approach allows fracking 
companies to determine the likely costs of compliance prior to 
commencing operations as well as the costs of avoiding regulatory 
coverage. Parties currently fracking can decide whether the costs to 
enter into compliance justify continued fracking. Adding Mapped Exit 
as a design consideration can also affect how the thresholds are 
designed. For example, a graduated set of site setback thresholds could 
be coupled with decreasing levels of regulation. This would produce a 
ratchet model allowing even finer assessment of exit costs and benefits 
by the regulated operations.86 
The most promising exit strategy, however, would likely be 
Adaptive Exit, for two reasons. First, fracking poses novel 
environmental risks. There are too many unknowns to design the clear, 
quantitative restrictions found in a Mapped Exit approach.87 Indeed, if 
exit had been explicitly considered at the regulatory design stage, some 
states might have employed less quantitative regulation than they do 
today, when in hindsight the regulations appear poorly chosen. Second, 
the regulation of fracking has become a highly contentious political 
issue, with some state and local jurisdictions choosing to ban fracking 
altogether.88 Inserting exit thresholds into regulation is more difficult 
in such a heated political environment. 
As our model predicts, Adaptive Exit provides a strategy well-
tailored to politically contentious issues with significant uncertainties. 
By design, the program is shaped explicitly to facilitate a more informed 
understanding of the issue so that, at a later date and with greater 
knowledge, the agency has the authority to relax or restrict the initial 
regulations as appropriate. 
 
 86.  To be precise, this would be an example of Mapped Ratchet Party Exit. 
 87.  See Merrill & Schizer, supra note 78, at 180–97 (discussing the novel risks).  
 88.  See Local Actions Against Fracking, FOOD AND WATER WATCH, 
http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/water/fracking/fracking-action-center/local-action-documents/ 
[http://perma.cc/C379-PAC6] (listing all state and local fracking bans). 
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B. Lookback Exit 
As with fracking, emerging regulatory challenges often arise in 
sparse information environments and are politically contested. At 
bottom, Adaptive Exit and Messy Exit both present attractive “punt it” 
responses to political divisiveness or perceived lack of information, 
particularly when both the information flow and political discourse is 
dynamic and unpredictable. However, Adaptive Exit and Messy Exit 
not only defer exit design decisions until after program implementation, 
they also involve no prior commitment whatsoever to engage the exit 
question. They are reactive rather than proactive, and arise in an ad 
hoc fashion. 
To be sure, administrations have often pledged to engage in a 
more purposive Adaptive Exit by periodically changing or removing 
rules they conclude are out of date, unnecessary, or overly burdensome, 
as most recently the Obama Administration’s Regulatory Lookback 
initiative has promised.89 These retrospective reviews can lead to 
significant reductions in government intervention, but they are 
hampered by two constraints. First, as executive initiatives, they are ad 
hoc, unenforceable, and unaccountable without significant executive 
commitment, institutionalization, and follow-through.  Second, even 
with that kind of executive engagement, agencies are stuck with the 
statutes they administer, which usually do not reflect the legislature 
having given much thought to exit. A statute designed exclusively 
around entry is unlikely to provide a robust platform for an agency later 
to explore exit options. As a result, the product of retrospective 
regulatory review is more often than not deregulation in the form of 
eliminating rules and requirements.90 Ideally, an agency also should be 
in a position to adopt Mapped Exit or Uncertain Exit strategies after 
the program has commenced. 
 
 89.  Regulatory Lookback is the Obama Administration’s term for retrospective regulatory 
review, under which “agencies shall consider how best to promote retrospective analysis of rules 
that may be outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or excessively burdensome, and to modify, 
streamline, expand, or repeal them in accordance with what has been learned.” Exec. Order 13563, 
76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011); see Howard Shelanski, Reducing Costs and Burdens: Further 
Progress in Regulatory Lookback Effort, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET BLOG (May 7, 2014, 7:05 PM), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/05/07/reducing-costs-and-burdens-further-progress-
regulatory-lookback-effort [http://perma.cc/5VHL-SVLE] (“Ensuring regulatory flexibility for 
businesses and reducing unnecessary regulatory burdens through the retrospective review process 
are top priorities for the President and the White House Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs.”). For descriptions of Regulatory Lookback and previous administrations’ retrospective 
regulatory review initiatives, see Bull, supra note 14 at 277–86 and Coglianese, supra note 14, at 
58–59. 
 90.  See SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 182–83 (listing various accomplishments of the 
Regulatory Lookback initiative, most of which were deregulatory in nature). 
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We believe government should consider committing to designing 
for exit in all cases, even cases when at the front end of program design 
the politics are difficult and information is incomplete. To encourage 
this, we propose a new model of exit—what we call “Lookback Exit”—to 
overcome the shortcomings of Regulatory Lookback and similar 
retrospective regulatory review initiatives through two novel 
components: (1) embedding authority for Adaptive Exit and Uncertain 
Exit explicitly in the statute ex ante, and (2) requiring the agency to 
engage in the lookback process and to justify its decision to use or not 
to use its embedded authority. 
First, unlike the case with the Obama Administration’s 
Regulatory Lookback and similar initiatives, under Lookback Exit the 
legislature would embed the tools of Mapped Exit and Uncertain Exit 
in the statute at the front end, explicitly making them available to the 
agency as it engages in the lookback process without having to engage 
in creative statutory interpretation. This approach would remove all 
doubt that the agency has the authority to engage in Adaptive Exit by 
adopting the methods of Mapped Exit and Uncertain Exit as the 
program moves forward. 
Indeed, there are already a number of examples where 
embedded exit tools have been placed in existing statutes to accomplish 
Lookback Exit. This is clearest in so-called general permit provisions. 
For example, section 404 of the Clean Water Act provides that the 
Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief of the Army Corps of 
Engineers (Corps),91 “may issue permits, after notice and opportunity 
for public hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the 
navigable waters at specified disposal sites.”92 In contrast to these 
“individual permits,” section 404(e) establishes a general permit option 
and the standards for its use as an alternative to case-by-case 
individual permits offering vastly reduced paperwork, pre-approved 
permit standards, and less direct regulatory oversight.93 
 
 91.  33 U.S.C. § 1344(d) (2012). 
 92.  Id. § 1344(a). 
 93.  The statute reads: 
 (1) In carrying out his functions relating to the discharge of dredged or fill material 
under this section, the Secretary may, after notice of opportunity for public hearing, 
issue general permits on a State, regional, or nationwide basis for any category of 
activities involving discharges of dredged or fill material if the Secretary determines 
that the activities in such category are similar in nature, will cause only minimal 
adverse environmental effects when performed separately, and will have only minimal 
cumulative adverse effects on the environment. Any general permit issued under this 
subsection shall (A) be based on the guidelines described in subsection (b)(l) of this 
section, and (B) set forth the requirements and standards which shall apply to any 
activity authorized by such general permit. 
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Over time the Corps has added more and more general permits 
to the regulatory regime and has modified them to adapt to new 
knowledge and changing circumstances, such that the vast majority of 
permitting under section 404 now takes place through the Corps’ 
numerous general permits.94 The Corps has done this by design in order 
to improve the opportunities for and clarity of Party Exit from 
individual to general permitting as projects are designed to fit the 
criteria for a general permit. As a congressional study of section 404 
permits concluded, “[g]eneral permits, including nationwide permits, 
are a key means by which the Corps seeks to minimize the burden and 
delay of its regulatory program . . . .”95 
Section 404 thus illustrates the exit design flexibility provided 
to an agency through embedded exit tools. Congress did not have to 
predict the various contexts in which individual permitting would be 
overly burdensome; rather, it gave the tools to the agency to engage in 
Adaptive Exit over time so it could create Mapped Exit (using objective 
general permit criteria) and Uncertain Exit (using qualitative criteria) 
mechanisms as the need arose. With over ninety percent of the demand 
on the section 404 permit program handled under general permits 
requiring a small amount of paperwork, or in some cases no paperwork, 
and in a matter of weeks,96 this truly accomplishes regulatory exit. To 
be sure, use of general permitting as an Adaptive Exit method must be 
justified under specific regulatory program criteria and the general exit 
metrics we developed above in Part II.B.—fast is not always better97—
but the point is to give the agency the flexibility at the front end rather 
than handcuff it to a No Exit outcome. 
 
 (2) No general permit issued under this subsection shall be for a period of more than 
five years after the date of its issuance and such general permit may be revoked or 
modified by the Secretary if, after opportunity for public hearing, the Secretary 
determines that the activities authorized by such general permit have an adverse 
impact on the environment or such activities are more appropriately authorized by 
individual permits.  
33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(1)–(2). 
 94.  The Corps’ general permit program began in 1977 with the agency’s promulgation of five 
general permits covering specified activities, such as utility line crossings and minor road 
crossings. 42 Fed. Reg. 37121, 37146–47 (1977). Congress amended the CWA in 1977 after the 
Corps promulgated this first set of general permits, essentially codifying the approach the Corps 
took. See Palmer Hough & Morgan Robertson, Mitigation Under Section 404 of the Clean Water 
Act: Where It Comes from, What It Means, 17 WETLANDS ECOLOGY & MGMT. 15, 17 (2009).   
 95.  CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS’ 
NATIONWIDE PERMITS PROGRAM: ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 2 (2012), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/97-223.pdf [http://perma.cc/4T74-FUR9]. 
 96.  See id. 
 97.  For a comprehensive overview of general permitting and the programmatic and general 
criteria for when it is appropriate, see generally Biber & Ruhl, supra note 15. 
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Under our proposal, therefore, a similar general permit 
authority, as well as standards for employing it, would be included in 
all statutes creating permitting regimes, so that agencies can 
periodically adjust (with justification) which actions receive the full 
permitting treatment and which receive a lighter permitting review. 
Similarly, statutes specifying regulatory thresholds would provide the 
agency room to adjust them based on standards contained in the 
statute, as the EPA attempted to do in its Tailoring Rule.98 Similar exit 
design options could include authority to reduce monitoring, inspection, 
and reporting for facilities proven to have achieved compliance over 
time, authority to extend permit durations, adjusting the size of surety 
bonds or other compliance assurance mechanisms, and authority to 
implement trading and other market-based instruments in lieu of 
comprehensive regulation. The point would be to equip the agency with 
a menu of exit options it can implement after inception of the program 
when it has sufficient experience with the program to make defensible 
decisions about exit. 
Consider, for example, how different the EPA’s experience in the 
Chevron case would have been had such mechanisms been built into the 
Clean Air Act.99 In Chevron, environmental groups challenged the 
EPA’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act’s mandate to regulate a 
“stationary source” to allow bubbling––measuring the emissions of an 
entire facility rather than regulating emissions from each individual 
smokestack at the facility. Bubbling therefore allowed plants to avoid 
regulatory requirements by increasing emissions from some sources 
while reducing them at others.100 It took extensive litigation before this 
policy was deemed legal.101 
By contrast, had Congress designed the Clean Air Act to provide 
the EPA the authority to, for example, “delineate stationary sources on 
a general or case-by-case basis in a manner that increases cost-
efficiency of compliance by a facility without increasing total pollutant 
loads from the facility,” the EPA could have implemented the bubble 
policy as easily as the Corps has designed its general permits. This 
example of Lookback Exit would not have required Congress to predict 
the bubble policy when it enacted the Clean Air Act. Once the EPA 
gained the experience to see the advantages of bubbling, however, it 
 
 98.  See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 
40 C.F.R. §§ 70.2, 71.2 (2015). 
 99.  See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 100.  JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 125 (4th 
ed. 2014). 
 101.  See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866. 
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would have been able to design and apply the new exit strategy quickly. 
Lookback Exit would have provided the EPA a general authority later 
to employ in an applied context. 
The second novel component of Lookback Exit is to require the 
implementing agency at specified intervals to reopen the issue of exit, 
either employing the tools of Mapped Exit and Uncertain Exit or 
justifying why not. Lookback Exit thus explicitly recognizes that at the 
time of regulatory- or benefit-program inception both political reality 
and information deficit may constrain the ability to design ex ante exit 
strategies, but they commit agencies to work toward adoption of 
Mapped Exit and Uncertain Exit models as the program evolves. It is, 
in other words, a binding commitment to employ Adaptive Exit, but 
does not limit the options to deregulation. For example, legislation 
creating a new program would add a requirement that the 
implementing agency engage in the deliberative exit review process we 
outlined above in Part III by a particular date. The exit conditions 
would not be fully specified at the inception of the regulatory program, 
giving exit an ex post quality, but the timeline for explicitly considering 
exit conditions and procedures would be mandatory. To be sure, this 
proposal has the downside of placing demands on agency resources at a 
time when budgets are tight across the government. It may be the case 
that agencies more often than not would choose to maintain the status 
quo. This process, however, would create the opportunity for more 
deliberate consideration of exit strategies than the blunt measure of 
eliminating rules and other forms of deregulation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Legislatures and agencies work hard to address new policy 
challenges, so it is understandable that thinking about exit from such 
programs is not foremost on their minds at the time of creation. But exit 
is an unavoidable consequence of any new government program. Every 
threshold and standard inherently creates a universe of parties that are 
“in” the program and others that are “out,” and very often it is possible 
that parties will move between those two states. As a result, it is as 
important to think clearly about exit in the administrative state as it is 
to think clearly about the creation of new programs in the first place. 
This Article has provided a framework for doing so. 
The administrative state has relied too heavily on deregulation 
and defunding as its default exit strategy. This Article is the first 
attempt to create a framework for how to think about exit, helping to 
explain its importance and guide its design. Through the example of 
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fracking and our proposal of Lookback Exit, we have shown how 
focusing on exit changes our analysis of regulatory design. 
Exit, it turns out, is a big concept for the regulatory state. By 
starting a dialogue and proposing a framework model, we believe new 
questions come into focus for administrative law scholars. Key research 
topics include, for example: 
 
   How would a law and economics perspective model exit? 
   How do exit strategies vary by institution, and are there 
principles suggesting when exit is best determined by 
legislatures, agencies, or courts? 
   What is the feedback between entry and exit strategies? 
   Which exit instruments should legislatures make available at 
the front end for agencies to engage in Lookback Exit? 
 
Exit is just as important to the administrative state as entry. 
Questions such as these listed above provide fertile ground for research 
and we trust this Article helps stimulate legal scholars to explore them 
further. 
 
